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Alpha is a key indicator of mutual fund performance. It is equal to fund’s risk-adjusted return 
in excess of a benchmark index. We find that Norwegian mutual fund investors cannot always 
rely on alpha based on the fund-selected benchmark index, to differentiate fund quality. Many 
managers appear to pick benchmarks strategically and/or adjust their portfolios in a way that 
maximizes alpha. Our analysis sharpens previous studies of the US data, where only a few 
alternative benchmarks were considered based on a coarse classification of fund investment 
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Compared to the best-fit alpha, alpha relative to the benchmark that best describes fund returns, 
alpha of an average equity fund appears to be 0,45% higher per year. Among equity funds that 
“exaggerate” their alpha, the number is 1,83%. We also find that the best-fit alpha, and not the 
fund’s official alpha, has a strong statistical association with fund closing decisions. Taken to-
gether, we find these results to be strong circumstantial evidence of strategic benchmark picking.
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In the standard principal-agent problem, the 
principal gleans the skill and effort of the 
manager, and, in cases where the two are 
unverifiable, designs a compensation scheme 
that motivates the manager to work in the 
best interest of the principal. In firms with 
dispersed ownership, an owner may not be 
able to influence the compensation scheme or 
hiring/firing choices directly. Hence, he can 
only vote by feet, selling the stock and putting 
the downward pressure on the price. In this 
paper, we will consider whether Norwegian 
mutual fund investors can even rely on com-
monly available information to judge fund 
manager quality.
In the mutual fund industry, the standard 
manager compensation is a percentage of the 
funds under management. Investors cannot 
decide on the manager or the size of the fee, 
but by buying more shares in the fund or sell-
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ing shares in the fund, they have a direct 
effect on the compensation received by the 
manager. Open-end mutual funds shrink and 
grow with investments being taken out of 
the fund (shares sold) and brought into the 
fund (shares bought). Additionally, the fund 
grows due to positive returns and shrinks with 
negative returns.1
[Ibert et al., 2017] find only weak sensitiv-
ity of fund managers’ pay to performance, 
for Swedish funds. That would suggest that 
a Scandinavian fund manager has a relatively 
modest incentive for return manipulation and/
or making returns look better than they actu-
ally are. This would bias us again finding any 
results in Scandinavian data relative to the 
international practices.
How do mutual fund investors make their 
buying and selling decisions? The skill of 
the manager is uncertain and unverifiable. 
Investors can, however, learn something about 
the skill based on the past performance of the 
manager. Good past performance is rewarded 
by more investors flocking into the fund. Bad 
past performance is punished by outflows.
However, what is “good past performance”? 
The golden standard for judging past fund 
performance is alpha (also sometimes referred 
to as Jensen’s alpha after the seminal [Jensen, 
1968]).
The alpha, the constant term in the single-
factor, as in [Jensen, 1968], or multifactor, as 
in [Carhart, 1997], regression is used in the 
literature to judge fund performance. Positive 
alpha is taken to be a measure of managerial 
skill. Alpha higher than that of competing 
mutual funds then should be rewarded by 
investor inflows.
1 While the standard management fee in the 
mutual fund industry is a fixed percent of assets 
under management, some mutual funds have option-
like features in the fee structure. For example, the 
management fee may be a percentage of the value 
increase, with a given cap and floor for the level, as 
in Alfred Berg Gambak. Also, in this article we con-
sider exclusively open-end mutual funds. Managers of 
closed-end funds do not get the benefit of increased 
pay due to inflows. Instead, they increase fees and 
are given new funds to manage by the relevant mu-
tual fund families [Wu, Wermers, Zechner, 2016]).
Is the fund’s alpha as obviously defined as 
the fund’s name? Unfortunately not. Alpha 
estimate is sensitive not only to the choice 
between the single factor and the multifactor 
model, but also to the choice of the index. 
What are the obvious choices?
First, one could choose the broad market in-
dex to evaluate fund performance. According 
to the CAPM, all fairly priced securities should 
have the same linear relationship between 
their beta and their expected return. However, 
different funds have different investment ob-
jectives. The alpha estimate may be influenced 
by the nature of the objective. Indeed, some 
indices themselves have been shown to have 
an alpha, when regressed on the broad market 
return [Cremers, Petajisto, Zitzewitz, 2013]). 
Indices by definition are passive investments. 
If a mutual fund manager invests and pas-
sively holds an index that has a positive alpha 
against the broad market index, he does not 
manifest special investment abilities. Such 
alpha is an artifact of the index he holds. 
Hence, the broad market index may be an 
inappropriate, even if an easy choice, when 
evaluating mutual fund performance.
Second, one could use the benchmark index 
chosen and announced by the fund.2 While 
fund managers are fairly free in their choice of 
the benchmark index, they are aware that their 
performance will be judged against the index 
they choose. If the fund manager believes that 
his target investor would rely on alpha esti-
mates, the manager may choose the index that 
will make the fund’s past risk-adjusted perfor-
mance seem as good as possible. Additionally, 
2 In the US, all funds are required to declare an 
“appropriate broad-based” benchmark index to the 
SEC, since 1999. The SEC does not regulate the 
choice of benchmark. However, once a benchmark 
is announced, the fund has to report performance 
relative to this benchmark for a given period, even if 
the benchmark is subsequently changed by the fund 
management. Internationally, many funds choose to 
declare a benchmark. In Norway, fund-chosen bench-
marks are available for most funds. Yet, there is no 
legal requirement to have a benchmark. The asso-
ciation of Norwegian mutual funds (VFF) has only 
non-binding recommendations for criteria to be used 
in choosing benchmarks by the association members.
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once he chooses an index, that choice in it-
self may influence his subsequent investment 
choices in such a way that current and future 
performance will seem as good as possible too. 
The manager’s choice of the benchmark index 
is not as innocuous as one could have thought, 
but rather is a strategic choice on the part 
of the manager. While benchmarks can be 
changed over time by the management, the 
SEC allegedly frowns upon benchmark flip 
flopping [Sensoy, Kaplan, 2005]. As there is 
no formal benchmark reporting requirement 
in Norway, one would think that Norwegian 
fund managers would experience less pres-
sure to keep the same benchmark. Hence, they 
would feel less constrained while announcing 
their choice of benchmark.3 That means that 
the alpha based on the fund-chosen benchmark 
may be misleading too.
Third, one could look up the fund bench-
mark selected by independent experts. When 
it comes to mutual fund analysis, Morningstar 
is the international leader in providing the 
relevant information and broad coverage. The 
Morningstar benchmarks may not have the 
drawbacks of the previous two choices, but 
they may still be not fund-specific enough. 
Indeed, the number of mutual funds domi-
ciled in a given country is frequently greater 
than the number of listed stocks (this is true 
both in the US and Norway, for example). 
Comprehensive analysis of each and every 
fund is beyond what any mutual fund data 
provider could do.
Fourth, one could search for the index that 
fits fund’s actual past performance best. This 
choice is the most demanding, but it has two 
advantages. The best-fit index is tailored to 
the specific fund. The index is chosen using 
objective criteria.
If the last approach is chosen, another ques-
tion arises. What constitutes the best fit? If 
this question is asked of a researcher, the 
most likely answer is the highest coefficient 
of determination, R2. In the literature and in 
3 To date, there is no comprehensive time series 
data for benchmark choices. Bloomberg, Thomson 
Reuters Eikon, and Morningstar report only the 
most recent benchmark.
practice, two other measures are often com-
puted, the active share and the tracking error.
The active share was introduced in [Cre-
mers, Petajisto, 2009]. It is the half sum of 
absolute deviations of the mutual fund port-
folio weights from index portfolio weights. 
The active share is supposed to measure the 
manager’s stock selection activity and was 
shown in [Cremers, Petajisto, 2009] to be a 
predictor of fund returns. The tracking error 
is typically measured by the volatility of the 
difference between fund returns and index 
returns. Some funds (e. g., Alfred Berg Global 
Deepwater Energy) may limit themselves to 
particular target and/or maximum levels of 
the measure, while others are explicitly (e. g., 
Alfred Berg Gambak) or implicitly noncom-
mittal. Tracking error measures the relative 
systematic risk.
Both measures are sensitive to the stra-
tegic index selection by the fund manager. 
Consider a “closet indexer” fund that follows 
index X, but strategically reports index Y as 
its benchmark. The fund may rank high on 
both measures of active fund management. 
Now, consider an identical fund that reports 
its benchmark truthfully — X. The fund will 
be reported with lower alpha (“worse” perfor-
mance) and lower measures of active manage-
ment. From this comparison of two identical 
funds, one could conclude that active manage-
ment is associated with better performance. 
This connection is also the one established 
empirically in [Cremers, Petajisto, 2009].
Similarly, [Amihud, Goyenko, 2013] find 
that lower R2 is associated with better per-
formance. They associate this result with 
greater selectivity. The approach in [Amihud, 
Goyenko, 2013] is preferable to the active 
share measure of [Cremers, Petajisto, 2009], 
in the sense that it does not require infor-
mation on portfolio composition. In the US, 
mutual funds are required to report their hold-
ings to the SEC at the quarterly frequency. In 
Norway, and in many other countries, there 
is no requirement for detailed public report-
ing. So, only R2 and the tracking error can 
be computed. Both are vulnerable to strategic 
selection of reported index.
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We suggest searching for the best-fit bench-
mark using R2, as the first step in analyzing 
how actively managed a given fund is. Only 
then, should one compute the active share and 
the tracking error and/or analyze relative R2. 
In this paper, however, we have nothing to 
say about managerial ability and active man-
agement and focus purely on the evidence of 
strategic index selection.
Suppose we analyze a fund and find that 
its R2 against the fund-selected benchmark 
index is low. This could be explained away 
by active management. Suppose this fund’s 
returns have a higher R2, when regressed on 
an alternative index. There are two potential 
explanations. First, it could be a fluke, an 
accidental outcome of mechanical matching 
between funds and indices. This undesirable 
outcome could be addressed by performing 
analysis for different time periods. Second, 
it could be a “mistake” made by the manager. 
If the mistake is an “honest mistake” and/or 
if we have encountered a statistical “fluke”, 
we expect to see no pattern of connection 
between alphas computed for fund-selected 
benchmarks (“fund-selected alphas”) versus 
alphas computed for best-fit indices (“best-
fit alphas”).
We find that the best-fit alphas are sys-
tematically lower than fund-selected alphas. 
The previous research on benchmark index 
selection by funds was ignited by results in 
[Sensoy, 2009]. He found nearly one-third of 
active US domestic equity funds misrepresent-
ed their investment style (along the size and 
value/growth dimensions). He attributed the 
result to unsophistication of investors. [Elton, 
Gruber, Blake, 2014] show that wealthy and 
institutional investors investing in separately 
managed accounts and collective investment 
trusts are susceptible to the same influences.
These studies considered only US (domes-
tic) equity funds. Funds that held both equity 
and fixed income instruments as well as funds 
that held internatinal equity were dropped. 
As a result, the universe of considered in-
dices was quite small. [Sensoy, 2009] con-
siders 12, and [Elton, Gruber, Blake, 2014] 
consider 22 benchmark indices. [Angelidis, 
Giamouridis, Tessaromatis, 2013] consider a 
horse race of 9 indices at a time.
Our study covers all funds domiciled in 
Norway. Norwegian market is interesting to 
study in this context for several reasons. First, 
it is a developed economy with wealthy and 
relatively well educated population. Second, 
just like in most other counties, Norwegian 
mutual funds can invest at their discretion 
as long as they stay within the confines they 
impose on themselves in the prospectus. Third, 
the main regulatory restriction that applies to 
Norwegian funds is the diversification require-
ment. Funds cannot invest more than 10% of 
their assets into securities of the same issuer. 
If a fund invests more than 5% of its assets 
into securities of an issuer, such investments 
combined cannot add up to more than 40% of 
the fund’s assets. This means that Norwegian 
funds may not be able to passively follow some 
indices, if indices have a small number of con-
stituents and/or constituents with weights of 
more than 10%. Fourth, Norway has quite 
lax regulation of mutual fund benchmark se-
lection by fund managers. Finally, Norway 
always ranks at the top of the international 
trust index. We can verify whether trusting 
Norwegian fund managers is less precarious 
than trusting US fund managers.
We make several contributions to the lit-
erature. First, we study benchmark selection 
across all types of open-end mutual funds: 
equity, fixed income, and mixed. Second, we 
perform comprehensive analysis against a 
vast number of potential benchmarks. Third, 
we supplement comparison of fund-selected 
and best-fit benchmarks with addition of 
Morningstar assigned benchmarks. Finally, we 
look for evidence of strategic index choice in 
a developed market with less stringent regula-
tion of index selection than the US.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 
I describes the data. Section II presents em-
pirical results. Finally, Section III concludes.
i. data
Our analysis covers the universe of Nor we-
gian-domiciled open-end mutual funds, dur-
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ing the period between January 1980 and 
March 2015, collected from the Morningstar 
database. The data includes all funds that 
were active at any point during the period. 
All return data is at the monthly frequency.
The universe of considered benchmarks is 
based on at least one fund in Sweden, Denmark 
or Norway declaring it or Morningstar choos-
ing it for at least one of these funds. One 
easy way for a fund manager to make the 
fund look its best is to choose the net return 
version of the index as the benchmark. Net 
return indices are computed under the as-
sumption that the investor (in this case, the 
fund) pays all withholding taxes on dividends. 
In practice, in most cases, mutual funds are 
not subject to double taxation. The capital 
gains tax is assessed once and is paid by the 
mutual fund investor. We choose not to drop 
these indices from consideration, even though 
they bias our results against finding any evi-
dence of strategic benchmark picking. We have 
1323 benchmarks with non-missing returns to 
include in the horse race of benchmark alter-
natives. Some benchmarks are pure indices, 
e. g. MSCI World Index. Other benchmarks 
are weighted sums of indices, e. g. 50% MSCI 
World Index + 50% 1-month LIBOR. We con-
sider both types of benchmarks equally, but 
we do not consider alternative weightings for 
benchmark components. Mutual fund bench-
marks are available only cross-sectionally.
In order to compute excess returns, we need 
to collect risk free rates. Morningstar selects 
what it deems to be appropriate fund-specific 
risk-free rates. The choice is apparently based 
on the primary target market of the fund. 
For example, some funds are assigned the 
3-month US T-bill rate. As all regressions are 
for monthly returns, we feel it is inappropriate 
to use risk-free rates with other maturities. 
Furthermore, as all funds are Norwegian and 
most investors are Norwegian, we believe the 
most appropriate rate is the 1-month NIBOR. 
However, for the sake of completeness, we per-
form analysis first with the NIBOR and then 
again with the Morningstar-selected rates.
There are three types of return series com-
puted by the Morningstar, net, total, and 
gross returns. Net returns capture evolution 
of fund share prices. Total returns combine 
net returns with any returns from reinvested 
dividends. Gross returns combine total returns 
with fund expenses. Gross returns are sup-
posed to most closely mimic fund’s portfolio 
returns. We, thus, rely on the gross returns 
data in our search for a best-fit index. We 
then use the best-fit index to compute alpha 
based on the fund’s total returns. It is the 
total returns alpha that will be salient, as it 
represents investor returns.
We require that the fund-chosen benchmark 
is available in Morningstar and its return se-
ries is non-missing. We drop virtual share 
classes of mutual funds. We require that at 
least 36 months of returns (gross and total) 
are available. This leaves us with 367 funds, 
if we use the NIBOR, and 343 funds, if we 
use the Morningstar-selected risk-free rate.
ii. results
The first step in the analysis is to run a time-
series regression for each fund-index pair,
Rf,t – RRF,t = αf,i + βf,i (Ri,t – RRF,t) + εf,i,t,
where Rf,t is the gross return of fund f in 
period t, RRF,t is the risk-free rate, and Ri,t is 
the return of index i in period t. So, for each 
fund, we run 1323 regressions (the fund-se-
lected index, the Morningstar-selected index 
and all other alternatives). As we consider 
funds that invest in different markets, no 
single set of factors would be appropriate for 
the analysis. We are naturally constrained 
to the single-factor model of [Jensen, 1968].
Then, we compare regression results and, 
for each fund, identify the index that cor-
responds to the highest adjusted R2. This 
index may be the fund-selected index, the 
Morningstar-selected index or any other index.
Most common best-fit indices are re-
ported in table 1. Fund-selected benchmark 
is always in top 5, but, for equity funds, 
it is not the top choice. The most basic 
benchmark, the Mutual Fund Benchmark 
maintained by the Oslo Stock Exchange, 
is  the most likely best fit. Interestingly, 
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the  Morningstar-selected benchmark is not 
in top 5, when the Morningstar-selected risk-
free rate is used to compute excess returns.
Finally, we rerun the same regression, but 
now using total fund returns on the left-hand 
side. It is sufficient to regress mutual fund 
returns only on the fund-selected index, the 
Morningstar-selected index, and the best-fit 
index identified in the previous step.
The summary of regression results is in 
table 2. We can immediately see that funds 
are much more likely to have selected a 
benchmark that makes their alpha look bet-
ter. Morningstar is far from being overly 
aggressive in the benchmark selection too. 
Morningstar is quite likely to agree with 
the manager on benchmark selection. One 
may argue that looking at the entire his-
tory since 1980 may be a too broad of a 
look. The performance measures reported by 
Morningstar are by default based on three 
years of observations. We repeat the entire 
exercise using only the most recent three 
years of data for each fund.4 The results are 
4 If a fund was closed before the end of the 
sample period, we go back until we collect three 
years of non-missing observations.
not as clear-cut as the longer term regres-
sion results. First thing to note is that while 
fund managers are still a bit more likely to 
flatter their own performance, Morningstar 
is, if anything, overly strict. As a result, 
over a shorter performance horizon, fund-
selected benchmarks produce higher alphas 
than Morningstar-selected benchmarks.
It may seem that fixed-income fund manag-
ers are the most honest, in particular, if one 
focuses on Panel B of table 2. It is hard to 
make this comparison, however, as there are 
fewer fixed-income benchmarks than equity 
benchmarks to credibly choose from. Unlike 
equity indices, many fixed-income indices do 
not have net return counterparts available. 
Additionally, the last three years coincide with 
the period of unprecedentedly low interest 
rates. Fixed income funds have lived through 
very difficult times.
It is informative to view results in table 2 
together with results in table 3. The lat-
ter shows average consequences of different 
benchmark choices. The numbers in table 3 
are annualized alphas, in percentage points. 
For example, an average equity fund has a 
best-fit alpha of 0,45% lower than its fund-
selected alpha. An average equity fund that 
Table 1
Most common best-fit indices
rank all equity Fixed income
Panel a. all periods, niBor risk-free rate
1 Fund Prospectus: 57 OSEFX Mutual Fund: 33 Fund Prospectus: 37
2 OSEFX Mutual Fund: 34 Fund Prospectus: 20 BofAML NOK 1M-LIBOR CM: 24
3 BofAML NOK 1M-LIBOR CM: 24 MSCI ACWI NR: 7 OSE 5-year T-bond: 8
4 Morningstar Selected: 9 Morningstar Selected: 6 NYSE 7–10-year T-Bond TR: 6
5 OSE 5-year T-bond: 8 FTSE All World NR: 5 Barclays Build America Bonds TR: 4
Panel B. all periods, Morningstar risk-free rate
1 Fund Prospectus: 50 OSEFX Mutual Fund: 33 Fund Prospectus: 31
2 OSEFX Mutual Fund: 34 Fund Prospectus: 19 NYSE 7–10-year T-Bond TR: 14
3 MSCI ACWI FM NR: 19 MSCI ACWI FM NR: 19 S&P 500 VIX Short Term Futures TR: 12
4 NYSE 7–10 Yr Treasury Bond TR: 
14
MSCI ACWI ex-Canada 
Index: 9
OSE OSE 5-year T-bond: 11
5 S&P 500 VIX Short Term Futures 
TR: 12
MSCI EFM NR: 7 Morningstar EM Corp-Bond TR EUR 
Hedged: 7
N o t e: “Fixed Income” funds in this table include funds classified by Morningstar as “Fixed income” and as 
“Money market”.
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Table 2
Manager, Morningstar, and best-fit alphas
Fund type
αF αM αF
> α* < α* = α* > α* < α* = α* > αM < αM = αM
Panel a. all periods, niBor risk-free rate
All 166 105 57 178  98 44  74 95 152
Equity 108  73 20 120  68 12  58 75  67
Fixed income  52  32 37  56  29 32  13 20  85
Panel B. Most recent 3 Years, niBor risk-free rate
All 146 131 52 124 147 50 106 61 154
Equity  99  75 27  81  90 29  89 42  69
Fixed income  43  54 25  41  56 21  14 19  85
Panel c. all periods, Morningstar risk-free rate
All 155 122 50 166 120 34  74 95 152
Equity 103  79 19 114  77  9  59 74  67
Fixed income  47  43 31  50  42 25  12 21  85
N o t e: αF is the intercept from the regression with fund-selected benchmark on the right-hand side. αM is 
based on the Morningstar-selected benchmark. α* is the best-fit alpha. “Fixed income” funds include funds clas-
sified by Morningstar as “Fixed income” and as “Money market”.
Table 3
differences in alphas
Fund type
E(|αF − α*|) E(|αM − α*|) E(|αF − αM|) 
αF > α* αF < α* αM > α* αM < α* αF > αM αF < αM
Panel a. all periods, niBor risk-free rate
All 1,559 1,482 1,515 1,529 1,144 1,087
Equity 1,826 1,591 1,927 1,617 1,073 1,288
Fixed income 0,754 1,234 0,614 1,252 0,991 0,336
Panel B. Most recent 3 years, niBor risk-free rate
All 2,503 2,567 2,501 2,205 1,231 1,231
Equity 2,883 3,827 3,308 3,252 1,225 1,664
Fixed income 1,451 0,901 0,907 0,540 1,108 0,272
Panel c. all periods, Morningstar risk-free rate
All 1,505 1,415 1,498 1,340 1,222 1,038
Equity 1,920 1,558 1,995 1,608 1,168 1,244
Fixed income 0,500 1,151 0,343 0,797 1,023 0,313
N o t e: The numbers in the table are in terms of annual percentage points. They are averages of alpha dif-
ferences for different subsets. αF is the intercept from the regression with fund-manager-selected benchmark on 
the right-hand side. αM is based on the Morningstar-selected benchmark. α* is the best-fit alpha. “Fixed income” 
funds in this table include funds classified by Morningstar as “Fixed income” and as “Money market”.
picked a benchmark with a higher alpha than 
the best-fit alpha overstates the risk-adjusted 
performance by 1,83%.
Panel B of table 3 makes it clear that 
regressions with a 3-year horizon are notori-
ously noisy, with much greater discrepan-
cies between what different alphas suggest. 
While funds, in general, are still more likely 
to choose a more favorable alpha than the 
best-fit alpha (Panel B, table 2), large alpha 
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estimate outliers make any average infer-
ences challenging (Panel B, table 3).
So far, we have looked at the regression 
results that used the 1-month NIBOR to com-
pute excess returns. Morningstar publishes 
fund-specific risk-free rate choices. We repeat 
our analysis using the Morningstar risk-free 
rates instead. The results are in Panels C of 
table 2 and table 3. The general message is 
still the same. An average equity fund over-
stated its alpha by 0,41% relative to the best-
fit alpha. We should be a little careful with 
results of Panel C, since the Morningstar 
risk-free rates have missing values, while 
the 1-month NIBOR has none. Hence, the 
number of observations is reduced making 
all estimates less reliable.
What if despite asymmetric nature of alpha 
errors the fund management truly believes in 
their chosen benchmarks? Then, the manage-
ment should not make any decisions that ap-
pear to be driven by the best-fit alpha. A very 
important decision made by fund families about 
individual funds is on fund closures. Fund fami-
lies routinely close non-performing funds and 
open new funds. Funds that stay open longer 
are those that perform best. If the fund man-
agement believes in their benchmark choice, 
their decision whether to close a fund or keep it 
open should be unrelated to the best-fit alpha. 
It should be based on the fund-selected alpha.
In order to study association between fund 
alphas and fund closing decisions, we first run 
several probit regressions. The results are in 
columns (1)–(4) of table 4. The left-hand-side 
variable is one if the fund “dies” during the 
sample period and zero otherwise. The first 
specification is the easiest and has only three 
alphas on the right-hand side, the alpha of the 
fund-selected benchmark, the best-fit alpha, 
and the alpha of the Morningstar-selected 
benchmark. While all alphas have negative 
coefficients, as expected, only the best-fit al-
pha is statistically significant. The decision 
to close is not independent of the age of the 
fund. [Lunde et al., 1999] show that the fund 
survival likelihood is not independent of its 
age. We add fixed effects for the years of fund 
origination in the data. Best-fit alpha remains 
negative and significant. We then split the 
sample into the funds that make their alpha 
look too good (regression (3)) and the funds 
that make their alpha look to low (regres-
sion (4)). Now, the fund-selected alpha, αF, 
becomes significant. Having an overly inflated 
αF is, actually, associated with a higher likeli-
hood of closure, while having an unduly mod-
est αF is associated with a lower likelihood of 
Table 4
life and death deicisions: different alphas
(1)
died
(2)
died
(3)
died
(4)
died
(5)
lived
Intercept –0,4019*** –0,1645 –0,8426 5,5441 33,5842***
αF –0,2888 –0,2592 2,8697* –8,2480*** 0,7815
α* –1,5413*** –1,1553** –4,7137*** 5,3988** 2,4718**
αM –0,8646 –1,1865 –1,4640 0,2452 2,1134
Origination FE NO YES YES YES YES
adjR2 0,8235
Df 316 287 133 128 287
N o t e: (1)–(4) are probit regressions. The left-hand-side variable is one if the fund “dies” during the sample 
period and zero otherwise. (5) is a regular OLS regression. The left-hand-side variable is the age of fund (either at 
the time of closing or in the end of the time series). Regressions (1), (2), and (5) are for all funds. Regression (3) 
is for funds that chose a benchmark with a higher alpha than the best-fit alpha. Regression (4) is for funds that 
chose a benchmark with a lower alpha than the best-fit alpha. αF is the intercept from the regression with fund-
selected benchmark on the right-hand side. αM is based on the Morningstar-selected benchmark. α∗ is the best-fit 
alpha. “Origination FE” is the year fixed effect for the year of fund’s origination.
*** indicates significance at 1%, ** — at 5%, and * — at 10%.
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closure. In each case, the effect of the best-fit 
alpha has a counterbalancing sign. Finally, 
we analyze association between lifetime al-
phas and fund longevity. Regression (5) is a 
standard OLS model with the fund age on the 
left-hand-side (either at the time of closing 
or in the end of the time series). We can see 
that the only significant slope variable is the 
best-fit alpha and it is positive. Longer-lived 
funds tend to have higher best-fit alphas.
We struggle to come up with a rational 
explanation for a strong statistical associa-
tion between fund closing decisions and the 
best-fit alpha. Unless we accept our results 
as convincing circumstantial evidence of 
strategic benchmark selection, one would ex-
pect no association. If the fund management 
knows its alpha to be a less accurate measure 
of performance than the available alterna-
tives, they will ignore it and make decisions 
based on a better measure. Interestingly, the 
Morningstar-selected alpha is insignificant 
in all considered specifications. Even though 
Morningstar benchmark and alpha are quite 
salient in the market, it also appears to be 
less important than the best-fit alpha.
iii. conclusion
Fund managers know that at least some 
in vestors will choose among mutual funds 
based on their alphas. Fund manager sal-
ary is positively affected by investors buying 
new shares in the fund. This gives the fund 
manager a personal incentive to make alpha 
seem as high as possible. We found that the 
fund-selected benchmarks give systematically 
wrong impression about funds’ performance 
records. The benchmarks make funds look 
unrealistically good, on average, especially 
over longer horizons.
Management of mutual fund families 
routinely reviews performance of individual 
funds. Funds that are deemed to have insuf-
ficient performance are closed. New funds 
are opened. The management also needs a 
criterion to judge performance. It appears 
that the criterion used by management is not 
based on the fund-selected benchmark, but 
rather on (or something closer to) the best-
fit benchmark. This appears to suggest that 
the inappropriateness of the fund-selected 
benchmark is known and acknowledged by 
the fund family management.
We have intentionally kept away from the 
topic of fund performance. It is beyond the 
scope of the paper to answer which funds 
outperform and which underperform. The 
literature on the topic is vast. We chose to 
take a step back and to analyze what can and 
cannot be used to measure fund performance.
The best-fit benchmark is identified purely 
mechanically. This procedural simplicity is 
both a blessing and a curse. On the plus side, 
one can quickly analyze many funds. At the 
same time, the best-fit benchmark match may 
be meaningless and purely accidental, in some 
cases. We have shown that it is meaningful 
on average. Assessment of potential errors 
is a topic for future research.
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Поведение менеджеров паевых фондов: действительная или притворная доходность
В. A. Бухвалова
Норвежская школа бизнеса, BI, Осло
Альфа является основным показателем качества управления фондом, показывающим превы-
шение доходности фонда над доходностью эталонного индекса с учетом риска. Мы выяснили, 
что инвесторы, вкладывающие в норвежские паевые фонды, не всегда могут осуществить диф-
ференциацию качества фондов на основе данных о величине альфа, рассчитанной с помощью 
выбранного фондом индекса. Представляется, что многие менеджеры на основе стратегических 
соображений выбирают индексы и/или формируют свои портфели так, чтобы максимизировать 
наблюдаемую величину альфа. Приводимый в статье анализ уточняет предыдущие исследова-
ния, основанные на американских данных, где рассматривались лишь немногие альтернативные 
индексы, связанные с упрощенной классификацией инвестиционных задач фонда, а не индексы, 
реально используемые каждым фондом. Полученные нами результаты обладают экономической 
значимостью. По сравнению с оптимальной величиной альфа, которая соответствует индексу, 
наилучшим образом описывающему доходность фонда, для фондов акций средняя годовая ве-
личина официальной альфа на 0,45% выше. У фондов акций, которые «преувеличивают» свою 
альфа, эта величина составляет 1,83%. Обнаружено, что именно оптимальная альфа, а не офи-
циальная альфа фонда имеет сильную статистическую связь с решением фонда о его закрытии. 
В совокупности полученные результаты представляют веское косвенное доказательство наличия 
у менеджеров стратегических соображений при выборе индекса.
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